|previous article in this issue||next article in this issue|
Document Details :
Title: A Problem of the Intentional Relation of Presentation in Brentano's Empirical Psychology
Author(s): TĂNĂSESCU, Ion
Journal: Tijdschrift voor Filosofie
Volume: 77 Issue: 2 Date: 2015
In this paper, I argue that Brentano’s analysis of the mental act of presentation faces a major difficulty. Specifically, Brentano provides a description of the intentional relation of presentation that neglects an important difference between sensory presentation and nominal presentation. I also maintain that there are four kinds of intentional relations in Brentano’s empirical psychology: 1) intentional relation as a genus, 2) the relation of bare intentional containing of sensory presentation, 3) the relation of signification proper to nominal presentation, and 4) the direction towards an object as it occurs in judgments and emotional phenomena.